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Abstract: Examining the relationship between jealous behaviour and the amygdala may be
quite informative about the function of the amygdala, but the amygdala may be less helpful in
informing us about jealous behaviour. Claims about the potential practical relevance of the
results also require that the magnitude of the effects inform the relevant discussion. The dogs
used in the study probably share some very important personality characteristics; this too
limits the practical implications of Cook et al.’s findings for dogs in general. It is nevertheless a
testament to the skill of the experimenters, and the amazing bond between dogs and humans,
that such research could be conducted at all.
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It is a remarkable feat to have trained 13 dogs to tolerate an fMRI scanner, let alone get them
to cooperate in an experiment in such a context. One cannot help but be deeply impressed by
the experimental virtuosity of the researchers (Cook et al., 2018). However, I am certainly not
the first to be uneasy about the real utility of much neuroscience research: There is something
of a backlash against many of the claims of neuroscience (Satel & Lilienfeld, 2013), a backlash
so well established that there is a backlash against the backlash (Marcus, 2013). At a broad
philosophical level, my concern with the target article is that it is implicit in the title that we
can take jealousy in dogs more seriously because of evidence from neuroscience. However, it
is an uncomfortable truth for some scientists studying emotion that the primary data for our
knowledge about emotions are subjective experience and human judgement. The plural of
anecdote in this case is data. Our knowledge of the localisation of affect is ultimately derived
from human experience and judgement. We think a particular area of the brain may be
associated with a particular emotion because we have induced a particular emotion and then
observed what the brain gets up to. We know what emotions are because we are emotional
beings. We began investigating jealousy in dogs because our experience with dogs suggested
that dogs were jealous. We did not start to investigate jealousy in dogs because of what was
going on in their amygdala. Studying brain/behaviour relationships provides a rich source of
information concerning brain function, but much less so concerning behaviour.
There are several more technical issues that I would like to mention. I am not at all sure
that amygdala function can provide really useful information. The amygdala is implicated in
just about everything from emotion, to fundamental cognitive processes such as long-term
memory, working memory and visual attention (Schaefer & Gray, 2007). The statistical analysis
is also problematic, as interpreting the magnitude of effects from a mixed-effects model is by
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no means straightforward. In the discussion, the authors make no mention of the magnitude
of the effects, but simply state that there was a positive correlation between aggressive
temperament and amygdala activation. The magnitude of any such relationship is crucial to
any claims that the information from the study could inform behavioural interventions.
My final comment is that regardless of the C-BARQ scores, given what the dogs were
required to do, I cannot think that these dogs were anything but highly social, unaggressive
and co-operative. These may be special dogs. In any study of individual differences, it is crucial
to have sampled the range of the trait of interest. The findings of a study of individual
differences using 13 very carefully trained and selected participants must be treated with
great caution.
My overwhelming feeling having written this commentary is social guilt (which I believe
is thought to be localised to the anterior middle cingulate cortex) because being a critic is easy,
and I remain amazed that the researchers managed to conduct this study at all.
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